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type of test would drastically curtail the authority of the judiciary, it would effectuate the various policy considerations embraced thus far by the Supreme Court in outlining its position
on the arbitration process. It would also give the contracting
parties the arbitrator's decision for which they have contracted.
Finally, it would make the arbitration process a more effective
instrument for creating industrial peace with maximum fairness
and minimum interruption by forcing the courts to abide by the
decision of the arbitrator in all but the most extreme cases.
In dealing with the question of arbitrability, the Supreme
Court was able to make its position sufficiently unequivocal to
42
compel the judicial system to yield to the arbitration process.
The Court must now make its position on judicial review of
arbitration awards similarly clear and unequivocal. It is incumbent upon the Supreme Court to effectuate more fully
the policies it arnounced in the United Steelworker cases by
limiting arbitration reviewability along the lines indicated above.

Labor Law: Union Member Expelled for Failure To
Comply with Union Exhaustion of Remedies Rule
Plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, ignoring the union's constitutional
provision requiring members to exhaust intraunion remedies

before resorting to tribunals outside the union. The General
Counsel of the N.L.R.B. dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff was
then expelled by the union for failure to comply with this provision. Plaintiff subsequently initiated a proceeding with the
N.L.R.B. claiming that the union had violated section 8(b) (1)
(A) of the Labor-Management Relations Act' by coercing him
in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act. The
Board found the union guilty of the alleged violation. On appeal
of the Board's order, the federal circuit court denied the Board's
42. While the judiciary uniformly followed the Supreme Court's
directive on arbitrability, its compliance was not always gracious.
For an example of one of the more spirited protests see Volunteer Elec.
Cooperative v. Gann, 46 L.R.R.M. 3049, 3056 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960).
1. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b) (1) (1964), provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rles with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; ....
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petition for enforcement holding that unions may require members to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures for four months
and that expulsion of members for failure to comply with such
requirement is permitted by section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the L.M.R.A.
and section 101 (a) (4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act. 2 Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 379
F.2d 702 (3d Cir.), cert. granted,36 U.S.L.W. 2008 (1967).
Section 101 (a) (4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act gives a union member the right to institute court
or administrative agency action subject to the provision that he
may be required to exhaust reasonable intraunion hearing procedures, not to exceed a four-month lapse of time.3 The courts
have disagreed as to the proper interpretation of this section. For
4
example, in Smith v. General Truck Drivers Union, Local 467,
plaintiff, who was issued a withdrawal card by the Local because he no longer worked within its jurisdiction, later applied
for and was denied reinstatement. He bypassed available union
appellate procedures, claiming they would be "futile" due to
union prejudice, and filed suit in federal district court alleging
that the union had unjustly refused to reinstate him. The
court dismissed the action as premature, interpreting section 101
(a) (4) as directing the courts to require the exhaustion of four
months of appeals as an absolute prerequisite to suit in federal
court.5 On the other hand, the court in Sheridan v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters,Local 6266 suggested that section 101
(a) (4) provides that the union can require exhaustion of four
2. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
§ 101(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964), provides in part:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before
any administrative agency... : Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures
(but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such
organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations ....
3. Id.
4. 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960). For other cases dealing with
this problem, see, e.g., Long Island City Lodge 2147 v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Mendez v. District Council for Ports, 208 F. Supp. 917 (D.P.R. 1962); Acevedo v. Bookbinders
Local 25, 196 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
5. It is difficult to understand how the court could have interpreted the permissive phrase "may be required" in the proviso to § 101
(a) (4) to impose an absolute duty upon the courts to demand four
months exhaustion of union remedies before hearing a case.
6. 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962); accord, Harris v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291, 321 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1963); Ryan v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 241 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Ill. 1965),
aff'd, 361 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
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months of hearing procedures, and that courts and the Board are
bound to require compliance with these exhaustion requirements.
However, a court may at any time review a case to determine
whether or not such hearing procedures are reasonable. If it is
determined that they are unreasonable, the court may hear the
case prior to the exhaustion of the four months of appeals.
Two further decisions have had a significant impact in this
area. The district court in Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
Artists7 dismissed as premature plaintiff's charge that the union
had unjustly disciplined him because he had not exhausted four
months of available union hearing procedures. On appeal the
circuit court reversed,8 granting an injunction and damages, reasoning that section 101 (a) (4) was directed to the courts and
the Board, enabling them, not the umion, to require exhaustion
of remedies for a maximum period of four months. The
court may, in its discretion, require exhaustion of remedies for
a maximum period of four months, but after that period it must
accept jurisdiction. In Local 138, Operating Engineers v. NLRB
(Skura),9 the Board was concerned, with whether the union
could punish 10 members for filing unfair labor practice charges
with the N.L.R.B. before exhausting intraunion remedies. Admitting that section 8(b) (1) (A) was not intended to interfere
with the union's administration of internal affairs," the Board
held that union rules which limited a member's access to the
N.L.R.B. were against public policy and therefore not internal
affairs protected by the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A). Thus, the
Board construed sections 7 and 8(b) (1) (A) as granting an absolute right of access to the Board, free from union restrictions,
to union members who felt that any right protected by the Act
2
had been violated.'
7. 189 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
8. Accord, Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp.
277 (W.D.N.C. 1963); Deluhery v. Marine Cooks Union, 199 F. Supp.
270 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
9. 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964).
10. The question of forms of punishment permitted under § 8(b)
(1) (A) is dealt with by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).

11. The Board acknowledged an earlier opinion, Local 283, UAW,
145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), which held that unions were not prohibited
by § 8(b) (1) (A) from fining members who violated lawfully established production quotas for this was an internal disciplinary procedure
with which § 8(b) (1) (A) was not concerned.
12. The Board granted a cease and desist order against further
union restraint without ever finding that the conduct for which the
plaintiff was originally fined was explicitly protected by § 7. Accord,
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The court in the instant case criticized as unjust the interpretation by prior courts that section 7 provides a general right
of access to the Board for union members alleging any unfair
labor practice under the Act. Indeed, section 7 says nothing
about a right to file charges with the Board. The court determined that section 8(b) (1) (A) protected only those union members who were coerced in the exercise of rights explicitly guaranteed by section 7. Furthermore, even if a section 7 right has
been violated, the union may require its members to allow the
union a reasonable time to correct its mistakes, for such rules are
protected by the proviso1 3 to section 8 (b) (1) (A). Thus, only by
alleging an act which violates section 7 and exhausting union
procedures for a reasonable time does a union member acquire
a right of access to the Board. This interpretation decreases the
number of cases before the Board and does not impair the
right of the member ultimately to bring charges before the
Board.
Both the court in Marine and the Board in Skura attempted to strengthen their interpretations of section 8 (b) (1) (A)
by illustrating its compatibility with their interpretation of section 101 (a) (4). However, this technique is unpersuasive, for it
calls into question the proper interpretation of section 101 (a) (4),
which is equally unsettled. The wording of both statutes gives
little assistance, 14 and the legislative histories provide a basis
Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The Board noted that, in order to keep channels to the Board open,
unions must not be allowed to restrict the rights of members to approach
the Board for it is unable to initiate its own proceedings. It drew an
analogy between the regulations imposed upon the conduct of employers and unions, holding that a union violates § 8(b) (1) (A) by restricting a member's access to the Board, just as an employer violates §§
8(a) (1) and 8(a) (4) by restricting an employee's access to the Board.
However, the Supreme Court recently rejected this analogy by holding
that except to regulate certain types of union organizational activities
and arbitrary actions by union officials, § 8(b) (1) (A) was not meant to
govern the relationships between the members and the union. NLRB v.
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 191-95 (1967). But see id. at
208-12 (dissent).
13. The court recognized the natural tension existing between the
text of § 8(b) (1) (A) and the proviso. For example, if the proviso
were given literal interpretation, unions could establish a rule forbidding
union members from ever filing unfair labor practice suits with the
N.L.R.B. simply by providing that infraction of the rule would result
in loss of membership. The instant court noted that this type of union
rule would obviously violate the purpose of the Act and would therefore
be void.
14. In support of its interpretation of § 8(b) (1) (A) the Marine
court noted that proposed § 8 (c) (5) which forbade an organization "to
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for several interpretations of each section. 15 However, the
L.M.R.D.A. statement of public policy 6 and the legislative history of the Act 7 indicate that congressional concern over union
abuses of union members was the chief reason for the L.M.R.D.A.
This would suggest that the proper interpretation of section
101 (a) (4) should, in cases of doubt, preserve the interests of the
union member before those of the union. The instant court's
interpretation of section 101 (a) (4) permits the court to require
further exhaustion of remedies even after four months have
elapsed but only if the union appellate procedure is reasonable.
Proponents of this rule frequently cite with approval the fact
that it places no time limitations upon the court's power to
require exhaustion. An intelligent application of the exhaustion
rule' s would reduce the number of cases plaguing the courts,
provide the courts with the union's better reasoned interpretafine or discriminate against any member, or subject him to discipline or
penalty, on account of his having criticised, complained of, or made
charges or instituted proceedings against, the organization or any of its
officers.

.

." was considered but deleted from the first Act.

In Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court suggested that proposed § 8 (c) (5), which was much broader than its counterpart § 8(a) (4), was dropped because of its broadness and because
Congress felt that discipline of union members for failure to exhaust
intraunion remedies was already prohibited by § 8(b) (1) (A). 350 F.2d
at 428 n.1.
15. For a comprehensive legislative history of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, see Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1960);
Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor Reform Act of
1959, 58 MicH. L. REv. 819 (1960); Rothman, Legislative History of the
"Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MiNN.L. REv. 199 (1960).

16. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
17. "Improper practices," mentioned in the policy statement as one
of the reasons for the Act, refer to the widespread corrupt labor practices discovered by the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities
in the Labor Management Field, established by S. REs. 74, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess., 103 CONG. REc. 1264 (1957).
18. The exhaustion rule, referred to by one writer as "[o]ne of the
favorite myths in the field of labor law," is the judicial policy of requiring union members to exhaust union hearing procedures before consenting to hear a case. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,
64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1086 (1951).
Courts, however, have been hostile to the rule because it oftentimes would result in undue hardship to the union member if left undisturbed. In their efforts to protect the union members, courts have
almost completely vitiated the rule with exceptions. Several of the most
frequently utilized exceptions to the exhaustion rule are excessive delay, futility of appeal, and irreparable injury resulting from exhaustion.
For a general discussion of these problens see Summers, supra at 108692; Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2 LAB. L.J. 487,
492-93 (1951).
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tions of the issues, and encourage the development of the union's
judicial process by requiring exhaustion of remedies in all cases
where it is practicable. 19
Critics point out that the Marine interpretation of section
101 (a) (4) allows unions to enforce exhaustion requirements,
which may tend to subvert the policy of the exhaustion rule by
prompting hostile courts to bring even more cases within one of
the exceptions to the rule rather than allowing the union to
discipline a member for violating exhaustion requirements. 20 A
suggested remedy to this problem would be a stricter application of the exhaustion rule coupled with a more liberal exercise
of the court's pendente lite injunction powers, thus holding in
abeyance unduly harsh sanctions imposed by unions until the
union appellate procedure has been exhausted. This approach
would, under the Marine holding, eliminate a number of suits
from the dockets while still preserving the right of union mem21
bers to a fair hearing of their complaints.
Further criticism of Marine arises from the hypothesis that
where, through judicial determination, union hearing procedures
are deemed to be reasonable and, as such, may result in the union
member's expulsion,22 the aggrieved member will be reluctant to
bring his objections to court for he will have to risk his membership on the outcome of a judicial decision based on the inherently vague balancing of interests test which recent courts have
adopted.2 3 However, such a result would be directly contrary
19. See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts
Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 207 (1960).
20. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-JudicialControl of Actions
of Private Associations, 76 HAv. L. REv. 985, 1069-80 (1963); Comment,
Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE L.J.
369 (1956).
21. This solution, however is not a complete panacea for it would
work effectively only in cases where the courts had confidence that an
injunction would eliminate the hardships. Many judges in certain circumstances would be hesitant to adopt this suggested method, realizing
that it would prove to be an inadequate safeguard against many subtle,
hard to prove discriminations. Summers, supra note 19, at 178.
22. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that out of
158 unions studied, 64 unions contained provisions in their constitutions providing for sanctions to be applied to union members who fail
to exhaust union hearing procedures before taking their claims to out-

side tribunals. DEP'T LABOR BULL. No. 1350, DISCIPLINARY POwERS AND
[hereinafter cited as
PROCEDURES IN UNION CONSTITUTIONS 28 (1963)
DEP'T LABOR BULL. No. 1350].
23. See, e.g., Libutti v. Di Brizzi, 337 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1964); Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964);
Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 189 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), rev'd, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
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to the purposes of the L.M.R.D.A., both because it limits a union
member's access to the courts and because it discourages the
24
development of sound union hearing procedures.
The Detroy interpretation of section 101 (a) (4) seems to present a more reasonable alternative for it does not force a union
member to risk his membership in order to have his rights determined. Furthermore, doubt has been cast upon the legitimacy
of arguments that the Detroy interpretation unnecessarily deprives unions and the courts of the benefits thought to result
from application of the exhaustion rule. There is no great risk
of a sudden flooding of court dockets under the Detroy doctrine
for both the expense of court suits and the union member's
unfamiliarity with court proceedings will tend to keep members
from filing suit outside of the union.25 The danger of the
courts' misconstruing union rules and constitutions is minimal.
Also, recent studies indicate that the guaranteed federal forum
provided by the Detroy decision has prompted the unions to
trim appellate procedures to less than four months instead of
26
discouraging their development.
Although the Marine court correctly concluded that section
8(b) (1) (A) extends protection only to plaintiff's alleging violations of section 7, its decision that union rules requiring a reasonable period of exhaustion are protected by the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A) is questionable. The proviso limits the substantive rights guaranteed by section 7 with the qualification that
they are not to be interpreted to interfere with the union's right
to prescribe its own rules relating to membership. However,
because the Board is unable to initiate its own proceedings,
section 10 by implication confers upon the union member a proSee also Note, The Labor Bill of Rights and the Doctrine of Exhaustion
of Remedies-A Marriage of Convenience, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 590 (1965).
24. A solution to this problem was suggested in Ryan v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 361 P.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 935 (1966). Although apparently adopting the Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962), interpretation of § 101 (a) (4), the Ryan court reasoned that Congress could not
have intended that a union member be punished for exercising his right
to a judicial determination of whether -the procedures available were
unreasonable, thus relieving him of the burden of complying with the
union's exhaustion requirement. 361 F.2d at 946. However, this solution
arguably does not comply with the words of the statute, for by dismissing the case the court is saying that the union procedures are
reasonable. It follows that the union member has violated the rule requiring exhaustion of four months of reasonable hearing procedures.
25. Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2 LAB. L.J. 487,
494 (1951).
26. DEP'T LABOR BULL. No. 1350, at 156-57.

